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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

- - - - - - - - - :AMANTHA KAY FRYE FARRELL,

-\'S -

JOHN W. TURNER, Warden,

Case No. 12163

Jtah State Prison,

Defendant-Respondent.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
The instant appeal is from a decision of the
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Utah

County, State of Utah, the Honorable Stewart M.
Hanson, presiding, denying the appellant's complaint
for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.
DISPOSITION IN THE LONER COURT
A Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed
in the Third Judicial district, in and for Salt

Lake County, State of Utah on April 16, 1970.

A

hearing on the merits was held before the Honorable
Stewart M. Hanson on May 26, 1970.

Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law were waived by stipulation of

counsel.

An order was entered on June 2, 1970

Lsrnissing appellant's petition.

It is from this

lsrnissal the present appeal is taken.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant submits the Court should reverse
he trial court's decision and order that the appellant
e

granted a writ of habeas corpus.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The hearing before the Honorable C. Nelson Day,

'ifth ,Tudicial District, June 12, 1969, is designated

1ereinafter as the Arraignment Hearing.
The hearing before the Honorable C. Nelson Day,
Judicial District, June 25, 1969, is designated
as the Sentencing Hearing.
The Hearing before the Honorable James P. McCune,
='ifth Judicial District, August 12, 1969, is desigriated as the Revocation Hearing.
The hearing before the Honorable Stewart M.
Hanson, Third Judicial District, May 26, 1970, is
designated hereinafter as the Habeas Corpus Hearing.
On June 12, 1969 appellant pleaded guilty to the
charge of furnishing implements to aid a prisoner
to escape in the Fifth District Court of Iron County.

The violation of Section 76-50-6 Utah Code Annotated
1953 was alleged to have taken place on May 23, 1969

11

t-]H'

l 1•n11 C\)Unty ,Ldl wlH'rr' th0 .1pp0ll,1nt';.

hu;,h1nd

11,,uglas f:. Farrell was incarccrdtl'd whi 1t' dWditiIHJ
sentencing for the crime.
At the time of the arraigrunent of the appellant
she was advised that she had a right to counsel and
that an attorney would be appointed at the state's
expense if she could not provide her own attorney.
(Arraigrunent Hearing, p. 3, lns. 1-18).

The appellant

informed the court that she did not desire the services of counsel.

(Arraigrunent Hearing, p. 4, lns.

was then informed that the charge against
her was "serious" and that she faced several years of
imprisonment upon conviction.

The information was

read to appellant charging her with supplying "hack
saw blades" to her husband in order that he could
escape from jail.

The plaintiff then immediately

entered a plea of guilty.
ln. 4).

(Arraigrunent Hearing, p. S,

Although the court summarized the charges as

found in the information the judge did not question
the plaintiff as to the facts or circumstances surrounding the offense.

Neither did he inquire into

any circumstances surrounding the guilty plea.
-3-

r

Tho court made arr<lngcmonts fnr

.i

pl'f' -s0nt0ncc'

report, and the plaintiff's husband, present during
the entire proceeding, urged the court to allow his

wife to reconsider the consequences of the plea, in
that she apparently was under the impression that by
pleading guilty she would be sentenced to prison that
day and could begin serving the sentence immediately.
(Arraignment Hearing, p. 6, lns 15-20)
s,=iid,

11

The court

Mrs. Farrell, if that is (sic) the reason you

turned down a lawyer is because you thought I would
send you to prison today, I want you to reconsider

that, if that's the reason you stated you didn't
want to be represented by an attorney."
ment Hearing, p. 6, lns. 20-24)
replied, "That's the reason."

(Arraign-

The plaintiff
(Arraignment Hearing,

p. 6, lns. 2 5 -26).
After learning this new information the court
appointed counsel for the appellant and recessed for
two hours to enable consultation with Mr. Christian
Ronnow, appellant's appointed attorney and also the
attorney who represented her husband at his arraignment.

Mr. Ronnow informed the court upon resumption
-4-

of the hearing, ffWell, Your Honor, we have consulted
and I have a real concern about her plea of guilty.
I

feel she does have a defense. ff

p. B, lns. 7-9).

(Arraigrunent Hearing,

It was then agreed that should Mr.

Ronnow, upon further consultation with the appellant,
conclude that the plea was wrongly entered he would
be

0ble to withdraw the plea within three days.

(/\rraigrunent Hearing, p. 8, lns. 15-30).

The court

then ordered the pre-sentence investigation to corrunence
in the event sentencing would be imposed.
At the hearing of June 12 the appellant was never
advised of her right to have a trial by jury, her
right to confront her accusers, her right to call
witnesses in her defense, and her right against selfincrimination.

In addition, she was not informed of

the necessary elements that comprised the crime with
which she was charged, questioned as to the facts
surrounding the alleged crime, or questioned as to her
reasons for pleading guilty.

This last point is

demonstrated by the fact that until her husband had
interrupted the proceedings, the court was unaware
that the appellant had waived counsel in order to
facilitate irrunediate imprisorunent.
-5-

Nothing in the record indicates that appellant
during the interim between June 12 and June 25, was
informed of the elements of the crime with which she
wos charged or the rights she was entitled to should
she desire trial.

Information was not given to the

appellant during the June 25 hearing on any of the
beforementioned issues.
l'l'
0

L

The court never questioned

examined the facts or motivations of this plea

r informed the appellant of her right to trial by

jury, right to face her accusers, right to call her

own witnesses, and right to remain silent.

The entire

proceeding was not concerned with the sentence to be
imposed as a result of the guilty plea entered on
June 12.

The appellant and her counsel made statements

tn mitigation only, and at no time discussed the

wtual facts of the crime or her understanding of its
!lements or defenses to the crime.

The appellant

adjudged guilty at the hearing of having furnished
lrnplernents to aid a prisoner to escape on the basis
lf her original plea of guilty.

She was sentenced

:o three years imprisonment, the sentence was suspended,
ind the appellant was placed on probation.
-6-

On August 2, 1969 the appellant again appeared
before the Fifth District Court of Iron County to show
why her probation
(K,,,.,,,',1tiL"'l1

not be revoked.

p. -;, ·111:;. 1'1--?7).

/\lthouqh

sh2 was informed of her right to counsel she requested
none be appointed and represented herself.

She was

then informed that should she be determined as having
violated her probation that the original sentence
would be executed.

At this time she

acknowledged

that she had pled guilty to a charge of being intoxi:;ated in public on July 11, 1969.

After discussing

the matters concerning this charge the court ruled
:hat this act constituted a violation of her probation
tgreement and subsequently sentenced the plaintiff to
:hree years maximum in the Utah State Prison.
On May 26, 1970 a hearing on appellant's appli·ation for habeas corpus was held in the Third
listrict Court of Utah.

By an order signed on June 2,

970 Judge Stewart M. Hanson dismissed the complaint
ithout opinion.

The present appeal is taken from

his dismissal.

-7-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT WAS DENIED HER CONSTITUTIONAL RICIIT
OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND DID NOT MAKE A KNCWING,
VOLUNTARY, AND INTELLIGENT PLEA OF GUILTY BECAUSE
THE SENTENCING COURT FAILED TO EXAMINE INTO THE
FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE CHARGE AND TO INSTRUCT
APPELLANT OF THE NATURE OF THE CHARGE AGAINST
HER, THE ELEMENTS COMPRISING THE CHARGE, AND
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WHICH ARE WAIVED BY
A PLEA OF GUILTY.
Appellant appeared before the Fifth District
Court of Iron County on June 12, 1969 for arraigrunent
and plea to the charge of violating Section 76-50-6
Utah

Code Annotated 1953.

Because this and other

hearings occurred after the United States Supreme
had delivered its decision of Boykin v. Alabama,
195

U.S. 238 (1969), the holdings of that case are

1pplicable to the arraignment and sentencing proof this case.
In Boykin, petitioner was a 27 year old Negro
1ho had pleaded guilty to five counts of armed robbery.
question of the punishment was submitted to a jury
hich subsequently recommended he be sentenced to

1

leath.

The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the con-

iction and sentence although three justices on their

wn motion dissented on the grounds that the record
-8-

.__:os inadequate to show that petitioner had intelligently

1

:rnd knowingly pleaded guilty.

Boykin v. State, 281 Ala.

659, 207 So.2d 412, 415 (dissenting opinion).

The

United States Supreme Court held that acceptance of
petitioner's guilty plea constituted reversible
error because the record did not disclose that the
petitioner had voluntarily, intelligently, and understandably entered his plea of guilty.

The Court held

that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required the reversal of petitioner's conviction,
since

e1

defendant who enters a guilty plea simultan-

?l'Usly waives several constitutional rights including
:he privilege against compulsory self-incrimination,
1allory v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), the right to
:rial by jury, Duncan v. Louisiana, 3 91 U.S. 145
'.1968), and the right to confront one's accusers,

'ointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).

"We cannot

iresume a waiver of these three important federal
'ights from a silent record."

3 95 U.S. at 243.

In

1ddition, the Court also imposed the requirement that
:he defendant must understand the law in relation to
·he factual context of the case.

-9-

Moreover, because a guilty plo,1
an
,1dmission of dll ·thf'
()f .i
formal criminal chL1rgc, it ('.IJ\ll\)t Ill'
truly voluntary unless the defendant
possesses an understanding of the law
in relation to the facts." 395 U.S.
at 243 n. 5 quoting McCarthy v. United
States, 294 U.S. 459, 466 (1969).
Application of the Boykin standards to the instant
case reveals that the arraigning and sentencing court

did not take the required steps necessary to insure
that appellant's guilty plea was knowingly and intellimade.

There is no evidence in the record to

indicate that the judge, either during the June 12
:irraignment hearing or during the June 25 sentencing
1earing, inquired into the factual basis of the plea
1s

relating to the alleged violation, inquired into the

1otivations of the plea itself, or advised appellant
:hat a guilty plea abolishes all rights of trial by
ury, confrontation of witnesses, and self-incrimination.
ly failing to follow the Boykin mandates the trial

seriously prejudiced appellant's plea.
•ecord of the habeas corpus proceeding

The

of May 26,

.970 indicates that at least four areas of importance

·o the appellant's plea were overlooked in the
-10-

and sentencing hearings.
First, a hearing following Boykin requirements
would have revealed that appellant acted in large

part because of the pressure exerted by her husband's
pleas and demands.

This was shown in the following

dialogue.
(Habeas Corpus Hearing, p. 4, lns. 9-17).
Q. Mrs. Farrell, will you try to remember
as best you can the contents of those letters
[written by her husband] as to anything your
husband asked you to do?
A. My husband threw out the letters, out
of the jail, and told me to break into the
jail and get the keys and unlock the door
and I told him at that time I was afraid.
Q. What did he advise you then?
A. He told me if I didn't do it he
would be in prison for twenty years.
Section 76-1-41 Utah Code Annotated 1953 provides:
Who Are Capable of Committing Crime--All
persons are capable of committing crimes,
except those belonging to the following
classes:
(8) Married women, unless the crime is
punishable with death, acting under the
threats, command or coercion of their
husbands.
·

....

hus, Section 76-1-41 codifies the common law
-11-

presumption that a woman who commits a crime upon
the instructions of her husband does so under duress.

c1 1 nonnell v. State, 117 P. 2d 13 9 (Okla. Ct. Crim.
4 ATR ::>GG; 71 J\T,R lllG, 1118.
13 1·c>

Courts

generally been unanimous in holding that the

yeight to be given to the "married woman" presumption
is a factual matter for the jury to determine in light
if all the circumstances present.

In State v. Carpenter,

l76 P.2d 919 (Idaho 1947) a factual situation very

;imilar to the instant case occurred.

In that case

1wornan was charged with aiding her common law
1usband to escape from jail by supplying him with
,wksaw blades.

On appeal the defendant raised the

,r0sumption provided by 17 -201 Idaho Code Annotated
which is identical to the Utah statute.

The

ourt in that case said, "The question of conjugal
tatus and what extent, if any, appellant acted
nder threats vicariously acquiesced in by Pease
her common law husband], or was dominated by his
orrunands or coercion, were questions of fact to

e determined by the jury."

Id at 920-21.

tate v. Cauley, 94 S.E.2d 915 (N.C. 1956).
ourse in a plea of guilty there is no jury.
-12-

See also
Of
However,

the sentencing court under Boykin has the same oblicp Li ,1n to examine the f ,ir.tudl contC'xt of the pl0a

induding the presumption of duress as would a jury.
This examination was not performed in the case at
bar.

It should be noted that appellant's husband
exerted pressure both before and after the alleged
corrunission of the offense.

In addition to the fact

that both appellant and her husband had the same
:ounsel (Habeas Corpus Hearing, p. 8, lns. 9-23)
it is also evident from the record of the June 12

1oaring that appellant's husband had discussed the

)lea with her and that he was well aware of her
)lea intentions.

(Arraignment Hearing, p. 6, lns.

LS-19).

A recent Utah federal district decision illus:rates the necessity of appraising a defendant of
ill the necessary elements which comprise an offense

ln order that he may make an intelligent plea.

In

v. Turner, 307 F. Supp. 936 (D. Utah 1969)
the plaintiff had been convicted of second degree
:iurglary and had initiated a habeas corpus action

m grounds that the guilty plea he entered was not
-13-

'.nowingly or intelligently made.

Specifically, the

Jlaintiff alleged that the sentencing court did not
_nform him of the difference between daytime and
iighttime burglary which was extremely relevant to
,:_.:-

because of the time element of the crime.

'he district court granted the motion using the

loykin criteria that a defendant must understand
:he nature of the offense as well as its defenses.
'he court said,

Unlike the record in Boykin, the
record before us here is not silent,
but it is hardly better and in some
respects it is worse, than a silent
record. Without leaving the matter
to a matter of presumption or supposition, perhaps consistent with the idea
that advice actually was given, the
record here expressly shows that the
plaintiff did not have explained to
him the nature of the charge, anything
about possible defenses, the significance of nighttime burglary as compared
to daytime burglary and other matters
which would be necessary to understand
in order to render a plea knowledgeable.
The only vital thing the plaintiff was
told was the extent of the possible
punishment for second degree burglary,
but in view of the peculiar circumstances
of this case it was rather essential that
the plaintiff have explained to him also
what the punishment for third degree
burglary would have been and, indeed,
that there was such a thing as third
-14-

degree burglary involving daytime
activity, i.e., activity after sunup. Id. at 940 (emphasis added).
see also Ernst v. State, 170 N. W. 2d 713, 718-19
1969).

The element of capacity in the case

at bar is analogous to the daytime-nighttime

distinction of the Belegarde case.
Finally, the American Bar Association in its
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY (approved draft 1968
hereinafter MINIMUM STANDARDS) also recognizes the
need to examine the factual context of a guilty

Section 1.6 states,
"Not withstanding the acceptance of a
plea of guilty, the court should not
enter a judgment upon such plea without
making such inquiry as may satisfy it
that there is a factual basis for the
plea."

In elaborating the need for this section, the
official commentary states,
"The defendant may not completely understand what mental state and acts constitute
commission of the offense charged, and
it may be that his conduct is not as
serious as that charged or that he has
a valid defense to the charge." Id. at 31.
The defense of lack of capacity must be made
timely, or it is lost; appellant's conviction cannot
-15-

now be attacked on the ground that she lacked capacity.
Nevertheless, section 76-1-41 Utah Code Annotated 1953,
raises a presumption of duress in appellant's case,
,c:1c )1ad the court fulfilled its duty under Boykin

it must be presumed the matter of duress would have

become apparent.

The court was required to canvass

,the facts with appellant and give her to understand
the applicable law.

Had the court

elicited the

facts, it must be presumed that the latter would have
come to light, and had the court instructed appellant
on the law, it was constrained to tell her that
capacity is an element of the offense and that lack
Jf capacity and duress is a defense.
1cid

In any case,

the court made sufficient inquiry it would have

iiscovered the influence of the husband had been
:xerted at all times relevant to the making of the
Plea; under such circumstances, "the utmost solicitude
Jf which courts are capable" required by Boykin

have necessitated reopening the matter of the
Plea at some time after the lunch recess on June 12
in order to give appellant a chance to make her plea

free of the influence of her husband, and with full
anderstanding of her defense.
-16-

Appellant was under duress at all times relevant
to the making of the plea.

It was the duty of the

court to take steps to dispel duress and to record
those steps in the record.

Had the court taken the

8teps required by Boykin it could have discovered that

was under duress and it could have given
her an opportunity to knowingly and intelligently
make

her plea.

It did not do so.

Second, had the sentencing court made in-depth
inquiries as Boykin required it would have determined
that the principal reason for the guilty plea and the
:ailure to request counsel was plaintiff's fear of
)eing left alone while her husband was in prison.

is evident from the following discourse:
(Habeas Corpus Hearing, p.S, lns. 17-24).
A. I know I told them I didn't want the
attorney out there.
Q. Why did you tell them you didn't
want the attorney?
A. Because I wanted to be with Doug.
I didn't have no place to go.
Q. You thought you would be with him if
he went to prison?
A. Well, no, I didn't think I would be
right with him, but I was scared, and I thought,
well, at least I will have some place to sleep
at nights and something to eat.

-17-

(Habeas Corpus Hearing, p.7, lns. 2-10)

Q. Did Mr. Ronnow ever advise you he
thought you ought to plead not guilty and
go to trial?
A. He said at one time, if I would
plead not guilty he was quite sure I would
be released because there was no evidence
I had committed a crime.

Q.

guilty?

In spite of that advice you plead

A. Because just like I said, I didn't
have no place to remain. I didn't know what
to do, and I was scared, and I decided I
might as well go to prison.
It would seem that motives other than guilt
contributed to the guilty plea.

This fear

if being left alone would have become apparent had
I

!he court made the proper investigation.

Boykin

.nd ABA standards were formulated to help prevent

uilty pleas from being entered for motives unrelated
:o

actual guilt.

The ABA Commentary to Section 1. 6

tates,
A guilty plea may be entered by a psychiatrically disturbed person; unlike
a trial of a criminal case, the brief
guilty plea process affords the judge
little opportunity to detect incompetency
unless the defendant is obviously retarded
or grossly psychotic. A clearly rational
defendant may enter a false plea in the
hope of achieving some goal, as where
an innocent defendant is seeking to
protect another person. These and

-18-

similar situations, although rare, have
been observed to happen from time to
time. Newman, Conviction: The Deter
mination of Guilt or Innocence Without
Trial, ch. 2 (1966) • • • Pollack, The
Errors of Justice, 284 Annals 115 (1952);
Hoffman, What Next in Federal Criminal
Rules? 21 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1, 10
(1964). ABA, Minimum Standards at 31-32.
21early, the motives behind appellant's plea should

.

have been examined.

This failure to examine these

directly violated the Boykin standards.
Third, the appellant at the time of the sentencing
1earing was unclear as to the crime she was charged
1ith and did not know the elements necessary for the

·rime.

(Habeas Corpus Hearing, p. 6, lns. 16-29)
Q. Do you understand that, have (after?)
you entered your plea of guilty, was the
charge against you providing implements to
escape?
A.

No, sir; I did not.
Q. Do you know what the elements of
this crime are?
A. I do now, but I didn't then.
Q. When did you find out what they were?
After I was in prison.
Q. Who advised you what they were?
A. I talked to Mr. Ronnow, and he told
me I had not been put in prison for aiding
and abetting, but I had been put in prison
A.

-19-

for furnishing implements, and furnishing
implements was a crime that was punishable by prison, but aiding and abetting
was not a crime punishable by going to
prison.
One commentator has suggested a way of avoiding
ny misunderstanding as to the offense charged.

" [ T]he judge should always very carefully
confront the defendant with the exact
nature of the charge • • • • In many cases
the indictment, which is usually couched
in technical language, is more understandable to the defendant if the charge
is explained to the defendant by the judge
in simple everyday language." Thompson,
The Judge's Responsibili
on a Plea of
Guilty, 62 W. Va. L. Rev. 213, 220 1969).
n the instant case although the court did read the
ndicbnent to the plaintiff (Arraigrunent Hearing,
. 3, lns. 1-17), it did not explain the exact nature
f the charge or of what elements the offense con-

isted, in an understandable fashion for the
ppellant.
Even before Boykin was decided many courts
equired the criteria of Boykin to be observed during
he plea of guilty for sound policy reasons.

The

hird Circuit, for example, in United States ex rel
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rosby v. Brierley, 404 F.2d 790 (3rd Cir. 1968)

aid,
We have heretofore spoken in a challenge
to a guilty plea entered in a Pennsylvania
court: TT[T]he question whether the plea of
guilty is voluntarily and intelligently
made can only be determined if it is shown
on the record what comprehension the accused
had of the nature and elements of the charge
against him, of the defenses available to
him, and of the consequences which might
flow from a plea of guilty • • • • and these
facts should appear on the record at the
time the plea is entered." United States
ex rel. McDonald v. Commonwealth of Penns lvania, 343 F. d 447 at 451 1965 •
Id. at 795 (emphasis added).
e also Pearson v. Turner, 306 F. Supp. 825
1,

Utah 1969) where the Utah federal district court

anted habeas corpus when the state failed to show
at the plaintiff understood the seriousness of the
arge in the sentencing hearing.
Although the court in the instant case made an
fort to inform the appellant of the charge against

r, it did not make sufficient inquiry into her
Jerstanding as required by Boykin.

Had such inquiry

=n made the court would have realized that further
)lanation of the charge and its elements was
for the appellant's intelligent comprels ion.
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Finally, the sentencing court did not advise
ppellant of the consequences of pleading guilty

n relation to her constitutional rights of trial

v jury, confrontation, and self-incrimire.tion.
1is failure to inform appellant as required by

)ykin resulted in appellant's ignorance of these
isic rights -- especially the right against self-

tcrimination.
(Habeas Corpus Hearing, pp. 9-10, lns. 16-3)
Q. Do you understand you have the
right to remain silent in such a trial?
Such as now?
Q. Such as a trial for the crime you may
be charged with in a felony case, such as in
the original case, if you had not plead
guilty?
A. No, sir, I didn't understand that
then, sir.
Q. But you do understand that now?
A. You mean that I would not have to
answer your questions if I didn't want to,
is that what you mean?
Q. Do you understand if you were charged
with a felony you would not have to take the
stand and testify against yourself?
A. Now since you just said it I have
learned this.
Q. That is the first time you have
learned it?
A.

A.

Yes.
-22-

Q.

You didnTt know it yesterday?

A.

No, sir, I did not.

As previously stated, Boykin expressly corrunands
at the three constitutional rights of trial by

ry, confrontation, and self-incrimination be
early explained to a defendant before the guilty
ea is accepted.

This explanation was not made by

e court in this case.

Without such explanation

ignorant defendant may not understand the signi2ance of the guilty plea.

The Fifth Circuit has

3ted this proposition well:
A plea of guilty is an abbreviated
way of going down the list of possible
defenses and privileges--right to counsel,
jury trial, confrontation of witnesses,
self-incrimination, etc.--and waiving each
one. The plea represents the relinquishment
of a bundle of defenses, and has no magical
implications with regard to finality beyond
that. The whole does not exceed the sum of
its parts. If one of the component waivers
was ineffective because of the inadequate
knowledge upon which it was made, the defect
is not cured by virtue of the fact that the
waiver was made implicitly, as part of the
guilty plea. United States v. Lucia, 416
F. 2d 920, 923 (5th Cir. 1969).
also MINIMUM STANDARDS

§ 1. 4

(a)

&

(b).

llure to inform the plaintiff of her constitutional
Jhts of trial by jury, confrontation, and self-23-

incrimination clearly violated the Boykin mandate
and caused appellant to make an unknowing and unintelligent plea.
The Washington Court of Appeals faced a case
::::-ilar to the instant case.

Substantially the same

:laims were raised on a habeas corpus proceeding
1s

have been raised by the plaintiff.

Although

enying the petition in that case because the original
earing occurred before the decision of Boykin, the
ourt said,
Petitioner alleges that Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, requires this
court to reverse this judgment. This
court concurs in In re Miller v. Rhay,
Wash. App., 466 P.2d 179 (1970) wherein
the Court of Appeals, Division II, held
the applicability of Boykin not to be
retroactive. It should be pointed out,
however, that the practical effect of
Boykin for those cases arising after
June 2, 1969 is to impose upon the
state that requirement of Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
which states that the court shall not
accept a plea of
without first
addressing the
personally and
aetermining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature
of the charge and the consequences of the
pleas. McBain v. Maxwell, 466 P.2d 177,
177-178 (Wash. Ct.App. 1970) (emphasis
added).
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ppellant submits that the sentencing court failed
J

live up to this requirement and consequently
to adequately examine appellant as to her

nderstanding, motives, and knowledge of the offense
harged and of the plea itself, and further failed
J

advise appellant of her constitutional rights of

rial by jury, confrontation, and self-incrimination.
CONCLUSION
Because the court clearly failed to follow the
established by the United States Supreme
mrt in the Boykin decision and because such failure
in appellant being unable to make a knowing,
)luntary, and intelligent plea, counsel respectfully
ibmits that the writ of habeas corpus should be

Respectfully submitted,

RONALD N. BOYCE
Attorney for Appellant
College of Law
University of Utah
Salt Lake City, Utah 84112
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